Who Let the Dogs Out? Quebec Court Denies Dogs’ Representative Plaintiff Status — But Opens the Door to Deeper Questions

June 26, 2025 | Karine Bédard & Sara Ray Ramesh

Can dogs be representative plaintiffs? The Court says no (for now). In Lemieux c. Sanimax Lom inc., 2025 QCCS 371, the Superior Court of Quebec’s Chief Justice rejected an unconventional request: to allow four dachshunds to serve as parties and representative plaintiffs in a proposed environmental class action.

The plaintiffs had accused Sanimax LOM inc. et Sanimax EEI inc. (together, “Sanimax”), a rendering plant, of creating environmental nuisances affecting health and quality of life. They sought to amend their application for authorization to institute a class action to include the four dogs as impleaded parties, and even proposed them as representative plaintiffs for other dogs in the affected areas.

Superior Court’s Decision

The court didn’t accede to this request. Animals, it observed, are not legal persons under Quebec civil law, even if the Civil Code of Quebec, CQLR c CCQ-1991, now acknowledges them as “sentient beings” with “biological needs” (s. 898.1). Instead, animals are governed by the provisions concerning property. Only those with legal personhood can sue and be sued; this is not reserved to humans but is a legal fiction that extends to other entities such as corporations. The Quebec Court concluded that the four dogs cannot complete the required procedural steps or testify – let alone hire counsel. It ultimately ruled that their presence is unnecessary to resolve the issues in dispute, as their owners would presumably be class members. The Court also held that the four dogs could not be class members but that this question could be dealt with during authorization.

Analysis

On its face, the claim might appear unserious, but it raises a serious question that Canadian courts and communities are beginning to grapple with: should elements of the natural world – rivers, forests, animals – be granted legal personhood?

In 2021, the Magpie River in Quebec became Canada’s first natural entity to receive legal personhood.[1] Through coordinated resolutions passed by the Innu Council of Ekuanitshit and the Minganie Regional Municipality, the river was granted nine legal rights, including the right to flow, be free from pollution, regenerate, and be represented by guardians in court. The Magpie River's personhood status is a bid to protect it from future threats, such as hydro development. This new status means the body of water could theoretically sue the government. This “rights of nature” movement, which is gaining traction globally, is now testing the boundaries of Canada’s legal system. It remains unclear how a court will react to legal action by Magpie’s guardians.

When legal personhood is not about being a person – indeed, corporations and municipalities are legal persons – but rather about recognizing an entity’s ability to have rights and responsibilities, one can ask: why not rivers?[2]

The potential is powerful. Legal personhood could shift how we frame environmental protection – not as regulation of resources, but as rights-based stewardship of entities with inherent value. Legal personhood is just another tool in our legal toolbox to protect the environment from global warming and exploitation.

Still, there are legal gaps. Canadian courts haven’t yet ruled on whether such recognition carries enforceable rights. Meanwhile, natural features in countries such as New Zealand, where the Whanganui River is a person under domestic law, South America, where Ecuador’s Constitution enshrines nature’s “right to integral respect”, and India, where the Ganges River was granted human rights, have been awarded similar rights and legal protections.[3]

Other questions remain unanswered. Could the Magpie River sue for damages? Moreover, legal personality entails rights and responsibilities. Does this open the door for the Magpie River to be sued for flooding?

But that’s not to say a serious, rights-based class action grounded in environmental harm is impossible. Now think of the 800 or so trees bulldozed at Ontario Place. This event left many wondering whether a class action could be brought against the provincial government on behalf of those trees. If a community wanted to protect trees at Ontario Place or stop deforestation in an urban zone, they wouldn’t name the trees as plaintiffs. Instead, they might:

  • name human plaintiffs with standing (e.g., residents affected by loss of green space);
  • seek public interest standing or pursue the claim as a class action;
  • seek judicial review of the government’s actions;
  • frame the harm using existing legal doctrines (such as the concept of public nuisance); or
  • advocate concurrently for legislative or municipal recognition of personhood or guardianship.

Takeaways

The Sanimax case reminds us that symbolic litigation has limits – but also utility. It provokes questions we’re not yet used to asking in court. As climate change and biodiversity loss accelerate, we may need to revisit our assumptions about who – and what – deserves protection under the law, particularly when natural entities, just as much as people, are affected by such changes.

Extending legal personhood to rivers, oceans, wildlife and entire ecosystems, grants them a defendable right not to be harmed and places them on the same legal footing as corporations, meaning their legal protections, grounded in natural rights, must be enforceable and meaningful, not merely symbolic. After all, if corporations – intangible, non-human entities– can be people before the law, why can’t dogs and trees?

 

[1] Brigitte Pellerin, “A New Era for Nature’s Rights”, CBA National Magazine, published January 31, 2024.

[2] Mihnea Tanasescu, “When a river is a person: from Ecuador to New Zealand, nature gets its day in court”, The Conversation, published June 19, 2017.

[3] Mihnea Tanasescu, “When a river is a person: from Ecuador to New Zealand, nature gets its day in court”, The Conversation, published June 19, 2017.

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