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My Problem with Baker and Li: A Tale of Clarity or Confusion?

November 16, 2026 | Kevin Fernandes

In this article I share my opinion on the recent Ontario Court of Appeal decision of Baker and Li.

I have a lot to say about Baker and Li (2026 ONCA 568), and it is not all the praise that has flooded my feed. To be fair, I have seen some of the criticism too, and I agree with much of it.

I am not disputing the Court’s rejection of a magic words approach. Nor am I suggesting that every hypothetical ambiguity should invalidate an otherwise enforceable termination provision. My concern is with where Baker takes that principle, particularly when viewed against the development of Ontario employment law over the last decade.

I see two fundamental issues.

1. The tension between employment law’s distinct remedial framework and the Court’s reliance on modern contractual interpretation principles

At paras. 28–30, the Court recognizes something important: employment contracts have characteristics that distinguish them from ordinary commercial contracts. The Court expressly acknowledges the power imbalance between employers and employees, the vulnerability of employees, and the remedial purpose of the ESA. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada has endorsed this view in its decision in Wallace ([1997] 3 SCR 701) at para 91.

Subsequently, the Court then proceeds to emphasize the modern approach to contractual interpretation reflected in Sattva (2014 SCC 53) and Earthco (2024 SCC 20): read the agreement as a whole, consider the surrounding circumstances, and determine the parties’ objective intentions.

The problem, in my view, is not that Sattva or Earthco are wrong. It is whether importing those principles so prominently into the termination-clause analysis risks diluting the very protections the Court has just recognized as distinctive to employment contracts.

Rossman (2019 ONCA 992) and Waksdale (2020 ONCA 391) were not premised on an idolization of magic words. They reflect a policy choice: employers are responsible for drafting employment agreements that comply with minimum employment standards, and employees should not have to litigate whether contractual language can be rescued through interpretation after the fact. Rossman, for example, emphasized the importance of ensuring that termination provisions do not contract below ESA minimums. Further, in Machtinger ([1992] 1 SCR 986), the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the subjective or presumed intention of the parties is not relevant when determining terms implied as a matter of law, such as the right to reasonable notice upon termination of an employment contract.

Baker moves the analysis in the other direction. At para. 40, the Court acknowledges that “at any time” can, when read literally and in isolation, create an inconsistency with the ESA, but holds that the language must instead be understood through the parties’ objective intentions and the agreement as a whole. That may be commercially sensible, but I am not convinced it necessarily advances the remedial purpose of employment standards legislation.

There is also a practical concern. The more heavily the enforceability analysis turns on context, objective intention and whether a hypothetical interpretation is reasonable, the more room there is for litigation over what should have been a relatively “straightforward” question: does the contract comply with the ESA?

Ironically, a decision intended to create certainty may create a new form of uncertainty for the employment bar.

2. The treatment of the saving language and the practical effect on Waksdale

The second issue I identify is, to me, the more significant issue.

The Baker contract contained language providing that the employee would receive the “minimum compensation or entitlements prescribed by the Employment Standards Act”. The Court relied heavily on that language in concluding that the broader contractual “just cause” provision was nevertheless ESA-compliant. At paras. 73–80, the Court effectively treats that language as sufficient to preserve the employee’s statutory entitlements even though the contractual definition of “cause” was broader than the ESA’s “wilful misconduct” standard.

That sits uneasily with the trajectory of cases such as Waksdale, Rossman and Dufault (2024 ONCA 915), where courts have been prepared to invalidate termination provisions because the contractual language itself could operate below the ESA floor. Waksdale, in particular, established that an unenforceable termination provision could render other termination provisions in the same agreement unenforceable as well.

Prominently, in Waksdale, at para 14: the Court expressly rejected the argument that a severability clause could cure an otherwise illegal termination provision.

Baker did not overrule Waksdale. The Court was specifically asked to reconsider it, a five-judge panel was requested, and that request was denied. At paras. 81–82, the Court expressly declined to reconsider Waksdale because it found the provisions before it compliant with the ESA.

If a broad contractual “just cause” provision can be preserved because a separate sentence says the employee will nevertheless receive the ESA minimums, how much work does Waksdale actually have left to do in cases involving similar drafting? Waksdale was not overruled in Baker and Li, but a “saving-provision” or a “failsafe provision” was effectively judicially created.

So where do we stand?

It is not difficult to draft an enforceable termination clause. This is where Bertsch v. Datastealth Inc. (2025 ONCA 379) becomes relevant. There, the Court of Appeal upheld a carefully drafted termination provision that expressly limited the employee to ESA minimums. Bertsch demonstrates that it is entirely possible to draft a termination provision that is both clear and enforceable, without the need to overhaul years of established employment law jurisprudence.

In consequence, I am not convinced that we need to move toward saving imperfect drafting through increasingly sophisticated interpretive techniques.

Time will tell whether the Baker and Li decisions are appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada and, if so, whether leave to appeal is granted. In my view, there is a desperate need for the SCC to address the above issues.

About the author

Kevin is an Ontario lawyer called to the Bar in 2023 and an associate at Julian Heller and Associates. His practice encompasses civil and commercial litigation, employment law, construction law, professional responsibility and wills and estates including appearances before trial and appellate courts in Ontario. Outside of law, he is a certified personal trainer and a saxophonist.

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