Court of Appeal Summaries (January 19 – January 23)

In Yates v. Iron Horse Corporation, the Court allowed the appellant’s appeal from the motion judge’s refusal to dismiss the respondents’ defamation counterclaim on an anti-SLAPP motion. The Court held that the motion judge erred in the s. 137.1(4)(b) weighing exercise by permitting the counterclaim to proceed despite the absence of evidence of harm or causation, contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hansman. The Court dismissed the counterclaim, awarded statutory damages under s. 137.1(9) of the Courts of Justice Act, and granted full indemnity costs.

In Foodies Curry & Shawarma Inc. v. Royal Paan Leasing Ltd., the Court allowed the appeal, finding that procedural fairness was denied where the application judge granted restitution for unjust enrichment without prior notice, on an insufficient evidentiary record and where the appellant was not given an opportunity to make submissions on that issue.

In Carter v. Carter, the Court dismissed the appeal in a family law matter. It upheld the contempt finding and 90-day custodial sentence, determining that the Mareva/preservation order was clear and operative, the appellant had actual knowledge, and he intentionally moved funds through multiple accounts in breach of the order.

In Sociedad Concesionaria Metropolitana de Salud S.A. v. Webuild S.p.A., the Court upheld a temporary stay of proceedings to enforce a foreign arbitral award until an Italian court determined whether the respondent to the Ontario proceeding was liable under the arbitral award, which had been made against a separate legal entity.

In Mellace v. Mellace, the Court allowed an appeal in a shareholder oppression case. The Court found that the application judge had made palpable and overriding errors of fact in rejecting the wife’s evidence over the evidence of the husband and sons, and failed to address the presumption of resulting trust.

In Lamba v. Ontario (Trust in Real Estate Services Act 2002, Registrar), the Court dismissed a motion for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal from a Divisional Court decision that had dismissed a judicial review application of a decision to revoke a real estate broker’s licence.

In Seferovic v. 285 Spadina SPV Inc., the Court confirmed that a vexatious litigant order remained operative unless reversed or stayed and that leave was required to bring any motions, including motions within an appeal.

In Rabinowitz v. 2528061 Ontario Inc., an appeal was allowed in part, with the Court finding that the 12% interest charged under a mortgage did not offend the Interest Act.

Civil Decisions

Yates v. Iron Horse Corporation, 2026 ONCA 38

Keywords: Torts, Defamation, Civil Procedure, Anti-SLAPP, Damages, Costs, Self-Represented Litigants, Full Indemnity, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.C.43, s. 136.1, Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, Libel and Slander Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.12, ss. 5(1), 6, Hansman v. Neufeld, 2023 SCC 14, Grant v. Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61, Park Lawn v. Kahu Capital Partners Ltd., 2023 ONCA 129, 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association, 2020 SCC 22, Bent v. Platnick, 2020 SCC 23, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Yates v. Iron Horse Corporation and St. Martin, 2023 ONSC 7232, United Soils Management Ltd. v. Mohammed, 2019 ONCA 128, Girao v. Cunningham, 2021 ONCA 18, Benarroch v. Fred Tayar & Associates P.C., 2019 ONCA 228, Fong v. Chan (1999), 46 O.R. (3d) 330 (C.A.)

Foodies Curry & Shawarma Inc. v. Royal Paan Leasing Ltd., 2026 ONCA 26

Keywords: Contracts, Unjust Enrichment, Remedies, Specific Performance, Restitution, Civil Procedure, Evidence, Procedural Fairness, Rodaro v. Royal Bank of Canada (2002), 59 O.R. (3d) 74 (C.A.)

Carter v. Carter, 2026 ONCA 29

Keywords: Family Law, Civil Procedure, Orders, Mareva Injunctions, Enforcement, Contempt, Remedies, Custodial Sentences, Evidence, Admissibility, Freedom from Self-Incrimination, Costs, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 11(c), Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, rr. 2(2), 2(3), 20(5), 31, Reyes v. Rollo (2001), 24 R.F.L. (5th) 120 (Ont. S.C.), Moncur v. Plante, 2021 ONCA 462, 57 R.F.L. (8th) 293, Boily v. Carleton Condominium Corporation 145, 2014 ONCA 574, Mohr v. Sweeney, 2016 ONSC 3238, Castillo v. Xela Enterprises Ltd., 2024 ONCA 141, Carey v. Laiken, 2015 SCC 17, Fiorito v. Wiggins, 2015 ONCA 729, Morasse v. Nadeau-Dubois, 2016 SCC 44, Chong v. Donnelly, 2019 ONCA 799, Follows v. Follows (1998), 41 R.F.L. (4th) 248 (Ont. C.A.), College of Optometrists of Ontario v. SHS Optical Ltd., 2008 ONCA 685, Kassay v. Kassay (2000), 11 R.F.L. (5th) 308 (Ont. S.C.), Sutherland Estate v. Murphy, 2025 ONCA 227, R. v. Bancroft, 2024 ONCA 121, R. v. Richards, 2017 ONCA 424, Bronfman v. Bronfman (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 336 (Ont. S.C.)

Sociedad Concesionaria Metropolitana de Salud S.A. v. Webuild S.p.A., 2026 ONCA 28

Keywords: Contracts, Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 106 and s. 6(1), Chevron Corp. v. Yaiguaje, 2015 SCC 42, Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, Haaretz.com v. Goldhar, 2018 SCC 28, M.J. Jones Inc. v. Kingsway General Insurance Co. (2003), 68 O.R. (3d) 131 (C.A.); Airia Brands Inc. v. Air Canada, 2017 ONCA 792, K.K. v. M.M., 2025 ONCA 446, Kyko Global Inc. v. M/S Crawford Bayley & Co., 2021 ONCA 736, Regal Constellation Hotel (Re) (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 355 (C.A.), Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation, 2013 ONCA 758, Halton Standard Condominium Corporation No. 550 v. Del Ridge (Appleby) Inc., 2023 ONCA 753, Buck Brothers Ltd. v. Frontenac Builders Ltd. (1994), 19 O.R. (3d) 97 (C.A.), 117 D.L.R. (4th) 373, Roxford Enterprises S.A. v. Cuba (T.D.), [2003] 4 F.C. 1182, Canada (Minister of National Revenue) v. Gadbois, 2002 FCA 228, Xerox Canada Ltd. v. MPI Technologies Inc., 2006 CanLII 41006 (Ont. S.C.), Hollinger International Inc. v. Hollinger Inc. (2004), 11 C.P.C. (6th) 245 (Ont. S.C.), Air India Ltd. c. CC/Devas (Mauritius), Ltd., 2022 QCCA 1264, Innis Estate v. Sunwing Travel Group Inc., 2024 ONSC 1102, Ainsworth Lumber Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2001 BCCA 105, Check Group Canada Inc. v. Icer Canada Corp., 2010 NSSC 463, SCP Distributors Canada, Inc. v. Silver Pacific Investments Inc., 2020 BCSC 1573

Mellace v. Mellace, 2026 ONCA 34

Keywords: Corporations, Property, Shares, Beneficial Ownership, Presumption of Resulting Trust, Gift, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16, ss. 105(1)(3), 255, Courts of Justice Act, 1990, c. C.43, s. 6(2), Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 20, Hendrickson v. Kallio, [1932] O.R. 675, Buccilli v. Pillitteri, 2016 ONCA 775, 407 ETR Concession Co. Ltd. v. Ontario (Minister of Transportation), 2004 CanLII 10753 (Ont. S.C.), P.S. v. Ontario, 2014 ONCA 900, Butera v. Chown, Cairns LLP, 2017 ONCA 783, Service Mold + Aerospace Inc. v. Khalaf, 2019 ONCA 369, Leitch v. Novac, 2020 ONCA 257, Chitaroni Estate v. Coleman (Township), 2025 ONCA 424, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Waxman et al. v. Waxman et al. (2004), 186 O.A.C. 201 (Ont. C.A.), Levac v. James, 2023 ONCA 73, Heliotrope Investment Corporation v. 1073650 Ontario Inc., 2024 ONCA 767, 2056706 Ontario Inc. v. Pure Global Cannabis Inc., 2022 ONCA 381

Lamba v. Ontario (Trust in Real Estate Services Act 2002, Registrar), 2026 ONCA 31

Keywords: Administrative Law, Judicial Review, Regulated Professions, Real Estate Brokers, Civil Procedure, Leave to Appeal, Extension of Time, Trust in Real Estate Services Act, S.O. 2002, c. 30, Sched. C, s. 17, Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. v. Froese, 2013 ONCA 131, Javid Estate v. Watson, 2023 ONCA 665, Lamba v. Mitchell, 2022 ONCA 164, West Whitby Landowner’s Group Inc. v. Exlixon Energy, 2024 ONCA 910, Whitehill Realty International Inc. v Registrar, Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002, 2002 CanLII 16925 (Ont. LAT), Sault Dock Co. Ltd. v Sault Ste. Marie (City) (1973), 2 O.R. 479 (C.A.), Iness v. Canada Mortgage and Housing Corp. (2002), 62 O.R. (3d) 255 (C.A.)

Seferovic v. 285 Spadina SPV Inc., 2026 ONCA 32

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Leave to Appeal, Abuse of Process Vexatious Litigants, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 2.1.02, r. 59.06(2), Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 140, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, Varma v. Rozenberg, 1998 CanLII 4334 (Ont. C.A.), Kallaba v. Bylykbashi (2006), 207 O.A.C. 60 (C.A.), Son v. Khan, 2018 ONCA 984, College of Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners and Acupuncturists of Ontario v. Yan, 2025 ONCA 380, Ontario (Attorney General) v. Reyes, 2017 ONCA 613

Rabinowitz v. 2528061 Ontario Inc., 2026 ONCA 21

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Real Property, Agreements of Purchase and Sale of Land, Mortgages, Interest, Remedies, Specific Performance, Damages, Civil Procedure, Amending Pleadings, Interest Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-15, ss. 2, 8, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 26.01, Matthew Brady Self Storage Corporation v. InStorage Limited Partnership, 2014 ONCA 858, John E. Dodge Holdings Ltd. v. 805062 Ontario Ltd. (2001), 56 O.R. (3d) 341, Pittman Brothers Production Ltd v. Evans, 2024 ABCA 185, 9725440 Canada Inc. v. Vijayakumar, 2023 ONCA 466, Padfield v. Martin (2003), 64 O.R. (3d) 577 (C.A.), Robinson v. Robinson (1989), 70 O.R. (2d) 249, 671122 Ontario Ltd. v. Sagaz Industries Canada Inc., 2001 SCC 59, Tuffnail v. Meekes, 2020 ONCA 340, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, Kentucky Fried Chicken Canada v. Scotts Food Services Inc. (1998), 114 O.A.C. 357 (C.A.), Krayzel Corp. v. Equitable Trust Co., 2016 SCC 18

Short Civil Decisions

Talpade v. AMJ Campbell Company Toronto East, 2026 ONCA 30

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Orders, Setting Aside, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 2.1.01

Flexpark Inc. v. Ercolani, 2026 ONCA 36

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Third-Party Claims

Adjala-Tosorontio (Township) v. Saunders, 2026 ONCA 42

Keywords: Costs

Abdelwahed v. Ahmed, 2026 ONCA 33

Keywords: Family Law, Civil Procedure, Orders, Enforcement, Self-Represented Litigants, Substantial Indemnity Costs, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 129, Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 31, s. 1(1), Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 61.08(2) and 61.08(3), McFlow Capital Corp. v. James, 2021 ONCA 753, Clark v. Clark, 2014 ONCA 175, Wildman v. Wildman (2006), 82 O.R. (3d) 401 (C.A.), O.K. v. M.H., 2025 ONCA 486

Rabbani v. Furney, 2026 ONCA 43

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Reconsideration, Fresh Evidence, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 59.06(2)(a) and (b), Render v. ThyssenKrupp Elevator (Canada) Limited, 2022 ONCA 512, Meridian Credit Union Limited v. Baig, 2016 ONCA 942, Mujagic v. Kamps, 2015 ONCA 360, Chuang v. Toyota Canada Inc., 2016 ONCA 852

Dong v. Boone, 2026 ONCA 37

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Vexatious Litigants, Orders, Setting Aside, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 2.1.01, 21.01(1)(b), 21.01(3)(d), 25.11(b) and 25.11(c), P.Y. v. Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto, 2020 ONCA 98

CIVIL DECISIONS

Yates v. Iron Horse Corporation, 2026 ONCA 38

[Simmons, Rouleau and Pepall JJ.A.]

Counsel:

RY, acting in person

C.P. Morris and B. Bochinski, for the respondents

Facts:

SM owned and operated Iron Horse, and operated 7692455 Canada Inc., which was known as Capital City Painters (“Capital City”). The appellant began working as a sales representative for Capital City. SM admitted that he was the appellant’s boss and that there was a significant power imbalance between them. SM began to send romantic text messages to the appellant. The appellant maintained that she played along with the messages because she feared what SM might do if she did not.

The appellant incorporated 2547510 Ontario Inc. to purchase the assets of Capital City. After the closing, the appellant failed to make the first payments due under the asset purchase agreement. SM sent an email to the appellant asking her to pay the arrears due under the agreement. She declined to do so and stated that she thought he had misrepresented Capital City’s revenues to her, at which point SM began sending the appellant a series of disparaging emails.

The appellant stated that she then began to receive hundreds of disturbing, sexually explicit phone calls and text messages from unidentified callers and senders. Someone had posted advertisements in her name on websites that featured ads for escort and sexual services. The appellant believed SM was responsible, which he denied. SM later sent the appellant an email he later admitted he fabricated, which was stated to be from the appellant, and insinuated that if he did not back off his debt collection, he would suffer physical harm. The appellant reported the emails to the Ottawa Police Services.
SM then commenced a Small Claims Court action against the appellant in which, relying on a forged promissory note purported to be signed by her, he claimed the balance of the purchase price. A guilty plea to uttering a forged document was entered on SM’s behalf in connection with the forged promissory note.

Following the Small Claims Court action, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation published an article about SM on its website. Subsequently, the appellant posted a hyperlink to the CBC article on her LinkedIn profile and on Reddit with comments and also replied to comments posted in response. In addition, she posted a review of Iron Horse on Glass Door.

The appellant sued the respondents for harassment, fraud, and violations of the Human Rights Code. The respondents responded with a statement of defence and a counterclaim for defamation. In addition to the counterclaim, the respondents sued the appellant in a separate action claiming for defamation and malicious prosecution. The appellant brought an anti-SLAPP motion seeking dismissal of the counterclaim. The motion judge dismissed the respondents’ action for defamation and malicious prosecution but refused to dismiss the respondents’ counterclaim for defamation. The appellant appealed from that refusal.

Issues:

1. Did the motion judge err in the weighing exercise set out in s. 137.1(4)(b) of the CJA by failing to dismiss the counterclaim?

2. Did the motion judge err in applying an incorrect legal standard to her assessment of the ‘no valid defence’ prong of s. 137.1(4)(a)(ii) of the CJA and in her analysis of the defences of justification and fair comment?

3. Was the appellant entitled to statutory damages under s. 137.1(9) of the CJA?

4. Was the appellant entitled to full indemnity costs under s. 137.1(7) of the CJA?

Holding:

Appeal allowed.

Reasoning:

1. Yes. The Court held the motion judge erred in the weighing exercise set out in s. 137(4)(b) of the CJA by failing to dismiss the counterclaim. As the motion judge was not referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hansman, the Court found there was a reviewable error. Once the reasoning in Hansman was applied the result in the appeal could not be sustained.

The Supreme Court in Hansman stated that there must be some evidence that enabled the motion judge to infer a causal link between the appellant’s expression and the harm suffered. The motion judge found that there was an absence of any evidence of a link between the appellant’s statements and any losses suffered by the respondents. Additionally, she did not draw an inference of a causal link. The Court held presumed damages were insufficient, as were bare assertions of harm. Having concluded that the respondents had not met their onus with respect to causation or harm, the motion judge erroneously determined that the weighing exercise favoured the respondents. In light of her findings and the dictates of Hansman, that conclusion was not available to her. The consideration of the public interest in continuing the proceeding had to be grounded in harm to the respondent that was caused by the expression of the appellant. Absent likely harm and causation, the weighing exercise could not benefit the respondents.

The other side of the weighing exercise evaluated the public interest in protecting the appellant’s expression. The Court found the motion judge’s reliance on the respondents’ interest in seeking redress and on the overlap between the claim and the counterclaim was misplaced. Standing alone, absent evidence of likely harm and causation, the overlap could not anchor a refusal to dismiss the counterclaim. The Court concluded that these findings compelled the dismissal of the counterclaim.

2. Not addressed. In light of the conclusion on the weighing exercise, there was no need to address the remaining grounds of appeal relating to the defence analysis.

3. Yes. The Court held the appellant was entitled to statutory damages under s. 137.1(9) of the CJA. The appellant led evidence to show that SM’s actions went beyond simply reflecting an effort to limit expression and included active efforts to intimidate or to inflict harm on the appellant. SM admitted to using litigation for strategic purposes and did so in an intimidating fashion. It may be presumed that damages would arise from the use of a SLAPP lawsuit.

4. Yes. The Court held the appellant was entitled to full indemnity costs for the appeal and motion under s. 137.1(7) of the CJA. The Court found that the appellant was self-represented and did a commendable job. As a self-represented litigant, the appellant devoted time and effort to do the work ordinarily done by a lawyer retained to conduct litigation and as a result incurred an opportunity cost by foregoing remunerative activity.

Foodies Curry & Shawarma Inc. v. Royal Paan Leasing Ltd., 2026 ONCA 26

[van Rensburg, Miller and Sossin JJ.A.]

Counsel:

H.S. Makkar, for the appellant

A. Duggal, for the respondent

Facts

The respondent, Foodies Curry & Shawarma (“Foodies”), entered into a written agreement to sell its business assets to the appellant, Royal Paan Leasing Ltd. (“Royal Paan”). The agreement contained a warranty that all chattels, equipment, and accessories that were the subject of the sale were free of encumbrances. By the closing date, two of the chattels remained encumbered by personal property security registrations.

Royal Paan had informed Foodies it would proceed with the transaction if payout statements were provided. Foodies discharged the first registration but did not provide a payout statement or an undertaking in respect of the second registration. As a result, Royal Paan informed Foodies that it would not proceed with the purchase. Nevertheless, Royal Paan ended up in possession of the assets.

Foodies brought an application by which it sought specific performance of the asset purchase agreement. The application judge denied Foodies specific performance but awarded it restitution for unjust enrichment as a result of Royal Paan’s use of the assets. However, restitution for unjust enrichment was not sought in the Notice of Application and was first raised at the oral hearing of the application. Accordingly, the record before the court was insufficient to adjudicate that claim. In the colloquy with counsel, the application judge indicated that he would not entertain the claim for restitution due to it not having been properly pleaded. Consequently, the appellant made no submissions on that issue.

Issue:

1. Whether Royal Paan was denied procedural fairness?

Holding:

Appeal allowed.

Reasoning:

1. Yes. The Court held that the manner in which the application judge proceeded was not only procedurally unfair, but ended up prejudicing Royal Paan in ways that could not have been intended. By finding for the applicant on the basis of a claim that was not properly pleaded, for which insufficient evidence was led and on which the appellant made no submissions, the application judge denied Royal Paan the right to know the case they had to meet and the right to a fair opportunity to meet that case. The Court accepted the submissions of the appellant’s counsel that the application judge was, to an unusual degree, disinclined to hear submissions outside of the narrow confines of his questions to counsel. The application judge essentially conducted the hearing as though it were a cross-examination of counsel. This was itself improper and jeopardized the fairness of the hearing.

Carter v. Carter, 2026 ONCA 29

[Paciocco, George, and Monahan JJ.A.]

Counsel:

C.J. Haber and A. Haber, for the appellant

J.G. Cox and J. Cox, for the respondent

M. Anevich, for the intervener Feldstein Family Law Group

Keywords: Family Law, Civil Procedure, Orders, Mareva Injunctions, Enforcement, Contempt, Remedies, Custodial Sentences, Evidence, Admissibility, Freedom from Self-Incrimination, Costs, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 11(c), Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, rr. 2(2), 2(3), 20(5), 31, Reyes v. Rollo (2001), 24 R.F.L. (5th) 120 (Ont. S.C.), Moncur v. Plante, 2021 ONCA 462, 57 R.F.L. (8th) 293, Boily v. Carleton Condominium Corporation 145, 2014 ONCA 574, Mohr v. Sweeney, 2016 ONSC 3238, Castillo v. Xela Enterprises Ltd., 2024 ONCA 141, Carey v. Laiken, 2015 SCC 17, Fiorito v. Wiggins, 2015 ONCA 729, Morasse v. Nadeau-Dubois, 2016 SCC 44, Chong v. Donnelly, 2019 ONCA 799, Follows v. Follows (1998), 41 R.F.L. (4th) 248 (Ont. C.A.), College of Optometrists of Ontario v. SHS Optical Ltd., 2008 ONCA 685, Kassay v. Kassay (2000), 11 R.F.L. (5th) 308 (Ont. S.C.), Sutherland Estate v. Murphy, 2025 ONCA 227, R. v. Bancroft, 2024 ONCA 121, R. v. Richards, 2017 ONCA 424, Bronfman v. Bronfman (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 336 (Ont. S.C.)

Facts:

The parties married on July 3, 1999, separated on December 12, 2009, and were divorced on April 20, 2018. They had two children who were minors at separation and adults by trial. The marriage was tumultuous and involved family violence by the appellant against the respondent and the children. The appellant was the sole earner and, on evidence accepted at trial, began earning “millions of dollars” during the marriage.

From the outset of the litigation, the appellant repeatedly failed to comply with disclosure and support orders, leading to the striking of his pleadings on financial issues on June 11, 2014. On February 6, 2019, Sutherland J. issued a broad preservation order and Mareva injunction over the appellant’s assets. In April 2019, the appellant was found in contempt of six disclosure orders. Continued obstruction resulted in a 30-day intermittent custodial sentence imposed by Jarvis J. in February 2020, and the matter was set for trial in November 2022 to bring “the litigation to an end”.

Despite the appellant’s pleadings being struck a decade earlier, he was permitted at an April 2024 scheduling conference to file updated financial and net family property statements and to make opening and closing statements. The trial in May and June 2024 proceeded on equalization, support, enforcement, and a further contempt allegation for breach of paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Sutherland J. Order.

The trial judge managed the procedure, ensured that the self-represented appellant received legal advice and understood his rights. While the appellant chose not to testify, he agreed to undergo cross-examination. The cross-examination related to the contempt allegation took place on June 27, 2024, followed by submissions on June 28, 2024.

On October 1, 2024, the trial judge released a comprehensive judgment exceeding 500 paragraphs. The judgment relied on uncontested documentary evidence. That evidence showed the appellant moved significant sums of money among six bank accounts, including approximately $750,000 deposited between July 2019 and October 2023 into one account.

The appellant admitted that he knew of the Sutherland J. Order. Despite that knowledge, he opened new bank accounts and continued to use existing ones. He also attempted to block financial disclosure. After receiving penalty submissions, the trial judge imposed a 90-day custodial sentence on April 4, 2025, along with costs of $650,000 to the respondent.

The appellant appealed this judgment.

Issues:

1. Did the trial judge err in finding the appellant in contempt and imposing a 90-day custodial sentence?

2. Did the trial judge err in finding that the appellant received a fair trial on the disputed financial issues?

3. Did the trial judge err in his cost award?

Holding:

Appeal dismissed.

Reasoning:

1. No. The Court held that the procedure on the contempt motion had been sufficient in the circumstances, notwithstanding that it proceeded within the trial. The appellant had notice, was advised to seek legal advice, and, after doing so, elected not to testify but agreed to be cross‑examined, which satisfied the applicable procedural requirements for civil contempt: Sutherland Estate v. Murphy, at para. 44; Follows v. Follows (1998), at para. 3. The Court also rejected the self‑incrimination complaint, explaining that s. 11(c) of the Charter is prospective and did not bar reliance on the appellant’s prior admissions at questioning, and that once he chose to give evidence at trial, that evidence could be considered.

On the merits, the Court affirmed the trial judge’s application of the three Moncur elements: (1) the preservation and Mareva provisions in the Sutherland J. Order were clear and unequivocal and remained operative; (2) the appellant had actual knowledge; and he intentionally operated and (3) moved funds through multiple accounts, including newly opened accounts, contrary to the order. It was open to the trial judge to decline to exercise discretion against a contempt finding given the appellant’s deliberate, years‑long misconduct.

The Court further upheld the 90‑day custodial sentence, noting the trial judge’s correct focus on denunciation and deterrence, his application of the Boily factors, the magnitude and duration of the appellant’s wrongdoing and its harm, the absence of mitigation, and the rejection of impecuniosity and health claims. Indeed, the Court observed that even a longer sentence would have been warranted.

2. No. The Court concluded that the appellant received a fair trial on the disputed financial issues. It emphasized that, despite the striking of his pleadings, the appellant was afforded substantial participation. He filed a 238-page professionally prepared opening and approximately 200 pages of sworn financial materials. The trial judge admitted this voluminous record and permitted submissions. The appellant failed to identify any legal error in the principles applied or any specific factual error. His complaint reduced to a disagreement with the amounts ordered, which did not justify appellate intervention. The Court also rejected the passport argument. It noted jurisdictional concerns arising from the Family Responsibility Office’s involvement and the absence of notice. No error was demonstrated. The challenges to living expenses and the continuation of the Mareva injunction were conclusory and without merit.

3. No. The Court found no error in the costs award. This Court rejected the appellant’s asserted inability to pay. The trial judge appropriately pointed out that, even if the appellant had lacked the ability to pay costs, this was the result of his own misconduct in depleting his assets in defiance of the Sutherland J. Order.

Sociedad Concesionaria Metropolitana de Salud S.A. v. Webuild S.p.A., 2026 ONCA 28

[Thorburn, Copeland and Gomery JJ.A.]

Counsel:

I. Nishisato, H. Meighen and S. Khalfan, for the appellant

G. Capern, M. Starnino, K. Borg-Olivier and G. Hoaken, for the respondent

Facts:

The appellant, Sociedad, is a Chilean company involved in construction and administration of public works. Astaldi was an international construction group and engineering company. Its primary centre of business was in Italy. Astaldi also had a division in Chile (“ASC”). In 2018, Astaldi commenced restructuring proceedings, which were completed in 2021. Following completion of the restructuring proceedings, Astaldi ceased operational activity. The respondent, Webuild, is a large multinational company incorporated pursuant to the laws of Italy and headquartered in Italy. The motion judge found that “at all material times” Webuild and Astaldi were separate corporate entities.

In 2015, Sociedad entered into a contract with Astaldi’s Chilean branch, ASC, to have ASC build a hospital in Chile. There were no other parties to the contract. On September 28, 2018, Astaldi commenced restructuring proceedings in Italy (the “Concordato”), to enable Astaldi to continue certain business activities pursuant to Italy’s bankruptcy laws. On January 2, 2019, after Astaldi ceased making payments to subcontractors and delayed progress on the hospital, Sociedad notified ASC that it was terminating its contract. Shortly thereafter, both parties requested an arbitration before a Chilean arbitrator. On March 27, 2019, Astaldi applied to the Rome Bankruptcy Court for authorization to formulate a proposal for ASC in the Chilean courts to restructure its financial obligations to Chilean creditors. On March 29, 2019, the Rome Bankruptcy Court granted this authorization to Astaldi by order.

On December 30, 2021, the Chilean arbitrator awarded Sociedad damages against Astaldi. The appellate courts of Chile upheld Astaldi’s liability to Sociedad but varied the quantum of damages. The award is still outstanding. Webuild was not party to the arbitration and the award does not address Webuild’s liability for the debts under the Arbitration Award.

In 2023, Sociedad brought an application in Ontario for recognition and enforcement of the Arbitral Award against Webuild. Sociedad claimed that Webuild acquired Astaldi’s liability for the Chilean project. In response to Sociedad’s application to enforce the Chilean Arbitration Award against Webuild in Ontario, Webuild moved to stay the enforcement of the award against Webuild on the grounds that Ontario has no jurisdiction to enforce the award and, in the alternative, that Ontario was not the convenient forum for addressing this dispute (forum non conveniens).

The motion judge granted Webuild’s motion and stayed the application proceedings on the basis that Ontario is forum non conveniens for determining whether Webuild assumed Astaldi’s liability. The motion judge held that the Italian courts are best placed to decide the issue of Webuild’s liability. The motion judge temporarily stayed Sociedad’s Ontario application pending the outcome of the proceedings in Italy.

Issues:

1. Did the motion Judge err by misconstruing the forum non conveniens doctrine by (i) applying it to a recognition and enforcement proceeding, and (ii) severing the issues of liability and enforcement and applying the forum non conveniens analysis only to the issue of liability?

2. Did the motion Judge err by misapplying the forum non conveniens doctrine and wrongly concluding that Ontario is not the more convenient forum for deciding the issue of whether Webuild is liable to Sociedad for the Chilean Arbitral Award?

3. Did the motion Judge err by treating the stay as a temporary stay when the effect of the order was to permanently stay the determination of liability for the Arbitral Award?

4. Did the motion Judge err in ordering that costs of the motion were payable forthwith?

Holding:

Appeal dismissed.

Reasoning:

1. No. The motion Judge did not err by misconstruing the forum non conveniens doctrine by (i) applying it to a recognition and enforcement proceeding, and (ii) severing the issues of liability and enforcement and applying the forum analysis only to the issue of liability. Sociedad submitted that the motion judge erred in law in staying its application because the doctrine of forum non conveniens does not apply to recognition and enforcement actions. Sociedad also submitted that the motion judge should not have severed liability from enforcement and stayed the proceedings on the basis that Ontario was forum non conveniens in respect of the liability issue.

The Court noted that in this case, unlike in Chevron, there was no “already-adjudicated obligation”. The Court noted that without a decision on Webuild’s liability for the Astaldi debt, the Ontario court’s role was not one of “facilitation” but rather, one of adjudication and, if and only if liability was established, enforcement. The Court therefore agreed with the respondent that this was not a standard recognition and enforcement case and given that the underlying obligation was contested, it must be determined before an order for enforcement could be sought.

2. No. The motion Judge did not err by misapplying the forum non conveniens doctrine and wrongly concluding that Ontario is not the more convenient forum for deciding the issue of whether Webuild is liable to Sociedad for the Chilean Arbitral Award. The Court noted that the motion judge correctly identified that the following foreign legal issues would need to be addressed to resolve determination of liability: (i) whether Astaldi’s liabilities under the arbitration are unsecured debts or pre-deductible debts under Italian bankruptcy law; and (ii) if they are pre-deductible debts, whether Webuild contractually assumed these liabilities.

The Court also noted that the motion judge did not fail to consider the potential prejudice to Sociedad, as she referenced the effects of the delay on Sociedad’s ability to enforce but found that it was not determinative. The Court noted that taken together, these factors led to the conclusion that Italy, not Ontario, was the most convenient forum for the determination of Webuild’s liability to Sociedad. The Court underscored that the motion judge’s findings on these factors were owed deference. The Court saw no error in the motion judge’s conclusion that the more appropriate forum for determination of liability was Italy.

3. No. The motion Judge did not err by treating the stay as a temporary stay. The motion judge imposed the stay pursuant to s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act. The Court outlined that appellate interference with a s. 106 discretionary order is only warranted where the judge had erred in law, seriously misapprehended the evidence, exercised their discretion based upon irrelevant or erroneous considerations, or failed to give any or sufficient weight to relevant considerations. The Court did not agree that the motion judge erred in law by applying the test for a temporary stay.

The Court noted that, as addressed by the motion judge, both the Italian and the Ontario proceedings addressed the overlapping issue of whether the liabilities related to the Arbitration Award were assumed by Webuild. The same facts applied in both proceedings and duplication of judicial and legal resources would be prevented as a result of the stay. The delay in Sociedad’s ability to continue their enforcement proceedings could be compensated. The Court saw no error with the motion judge’s characterization of the stay as temporary, and thus she did not err in applying the Hollinger test for a temporary stay.

4. No. The motion Judge did not err in ordering that costs of the motion were payable forthwith. The motion judge ordered that as the successful party on the motion, Webuild was entitled to its costs. Sociedad took the position that requiring it to pay costs now would be unfair and that, as a result, any costs order should not be made until the parties returned to the Ontario courts. Sociedad claimed procedural unfairness because the motion judge rejected its position on costs without hearing its full submissions.

The Court was not persuaded that Sociedad suffered any procedural unfairness. The Court noted that an email provided to the motion judge provided the Court with an understanding of each party’s position on the issue, and the motion judge acknowledged Sociedad’s position as set out in the email. The motion judge did not find it necessary to ask for further submissions nor were they necessary, as it was not yet clear whether the parties would be returning to the Ontario courts.

Mellace v. Mellace, 2026 ONCA 34

[van Rensburg, Dawe and Madsen JJ.A.]

Counsel:

P. Baxi and M. Grewal, for the appellants

G. Matushansky, for the respondents

Keywords: Corporations, Property, Shares, Beneficial Ownership, Presumption of Resulting Trust, Gift, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16, ss. 105(1)(3), 255, Courts of Justice Act, 1990, c. C.43, s. 6(2), Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 20, Hendrickson v. Kallio, [1932] O.R. 675, Buccilli v. Pillitteri, 2016 ONCA 775, 407 ETR Concession Co. Ltd. v. Ontario (Minister of Transportation), 2004 CanLII 10753 (Ont. S.C.), P.S. v. Ontario, 2014 ONCA 900, Butera v. Chown, Cairns LLP, 2017 ONCA 783, Service Mold + Aerospace Inc. v. Khalaf, 2019 ONCA 369, Leitch v. Novac, 2020 ONCA 257, Chitaroni Estate v. Coleman (Township), 2025 ONCA 424, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Waxman et al. v. Waxman et al. (2004), 186 O.A.C. 201 (Ont. C.A.), Levac v. James, 2023 ONCA 73, Heliotrope Investment Corporation v. 1073650 Ontario Inc., 2024 ONCA 767, 2056706 Ontario Inc. v. Pure Global Cannabis Inc., 2022 ONCA 381

Facts:

A husband and wife separated after 33 years of marriage in 2021. The dispute revolved around the family company, 1225046 Ontario Inc. (“122” or the “company”), and title to the “Alliston property”. The company was formed to hold and lease real estate owning five rental properties, three of which were leased. The respondent husband and two sons, AM and GM, stated that each family member, including the wife, owned a 25% share of 122. The appellant wife claimed that she and her husband each held 50% of the total issued and outstanding shares.

The husband and sons held a Special Meeting of Shareholders on June 28, 2022, with only the husband and sons present due to their stated concerns about the wife’s alleged mismanagement of 122. They passed a resolution removing the wife as a director and appointing AM as sole director. By director’s resolution, AM then removed the wife as president, secretary, and treasurer; appointed himself president; and named GM secretary and treasurer.

The parties also disagreed on the beneficial ownership of the Alliston property, to which legal title was held by the wife and the sons. The wife stated that she was the sole beneficial owner, having advanced the down payment and made all mortgage and other payments since its acquisition. The husband and sons stated that the property was a gift to AM and GM and that they were the sole beneficial owners.

The application judge determined that: (a) AM and GM were equal shareholders of 122 together with the husband and the wife; (b) the Shareholders’ Meeting held on June 28, 2022, was validly held and its results binding; (c) AM had been sole director and President and GM Treasurer-Secretary of 122 since June 28, 2022; and (d) AM and GM have been the beneficial owners of the Alliston property since its purchase in 2014.

Issues:

1. Was the appeal brought in the wrong court given the interlocutory nature of the issues and that the order was made under the OBCA?

2. Did the application judge err in hearing the applications on a partial basis?

3. Did the application judge err in her determination of the share structure of 122 and in validating the Shareholders’ Meeting?

4. Did the application judge err in determining the beneficial ownership of the Alliston property by failing to address the presumption of resulting trust?

Holding:

Appeal allowed.

Reasoning:

1. No. The Court ruled the appeal properly lied with the Court. The determination of beneficial ownership of the Alliston property was made on common law principles, fell outside the purview of the OBCA, and determined the rights of the parties in relation to that property. Pursuant to s. 6(2) of the Courts of Justice Act, because part of the order was final and grounded in common law principles, the entire order was appealable to the Court.

2. No. The Court did not interfere with the application judge’s discretionary decision to bifurcate the application. There were numerous court appearances before the hearing resulting in the order under appeal. It was unclear whether, during those court appearances, the wife opposed proceeding on a partial basis. While her factum resisted bifurcation, in oral argument, counsel at no point argued that the matter should not be heard on a partial basis. The matter also had been adjourned on several occasions to allow for cross-examinations and the completion of undertakings. At the hearing, the application judge had before her an extensive record. During oral submissions on appeal, the wife’s counsel confirmed that only the business valuation remained to be prepared, the outcome of which did not bear on the issues before the court.

3. Yes. In the Court’s view both determinations reflected a failure to consider relevant evidence bearing on contested issues. The Court believed the application judge relied on evidence that lacked credibility. Additionally, at no point did she explain why she preferred the husband’s evidence over the wife’s or the basis on which she found the wife’s evidence not to be credible. The Court believed the application judge had important evidence relevant to the share structure of 122 that remained unexamined in her reasons. In particular, the evidence of the accountant, as well as the corporate and personal tax returns of each family member, supported a contrary conclusion without reason given for their rejection. It was open to the application judge to consider and reject the evidence of the accountant. The omission of any reference to or analysis of this evidence from the reasons entirely, however, where clearly relevant to the factual and credibility determinations made, constituted a palpable and overriding error.

While the application judge found it problematic that specific tax returns of the sons did not reflect dividends from 122, she did not reconcile this with her conclusion that the children were 25% shareholders. Nor did she grapple with the impact of her statement that it was “plausible” that either the husband or the wife could have prepared the tax returns and filings without the involvement of the sons. Given that the application judge found it plausible that the husband was involved in preparing the tax returns, an explanation was required for rejecting this possibility.

Given that s. 105(1) of the OBCA provided that a shareholder is required to hold only 5% of the issued shares of a corporation to requisition a meeting, it was likely that the meeting was validly called, irrespective of which party prevailed in terms of the ultimate determination of share structure. However, given the requirements under the OBCA for a quorum for business to be transacted and to remove and replace a director, whether the meeting’s results were binding rested on the determination of share structure.

4. Yes. The evidence before the application judge included that the wife had advanced the funds for the down-payment and made all mortgage and maintenance payments since the acquisition of the property. However, the wife and both sons were all on title. These underlying (and uncontested) facts required the application judge to engage directly with the presumption of resulting trust and find on a balance of probabilities that the presumption was rebutted by evidence of a gift. The reasons reflected neither an engagement with the presumption nor findings of fact capable, without more, of rebutting the presumption.

Lamba v. Ontario (Trust in Real Estate Services Act 2002, Registrar), 2026 ONCA 31

[Paciocco J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

A.L., attending in person

S. Smith, for the responding party, Registrar, Trust in Real Estate Services Act, 2002

S. Johal, for the responding party, the Licence Appeal Tribunal

Facts:

A.L’s registered real estate broker licence was revoked on March 3, 2022. He applied to have the licence reinstated, which required him to show, that either: a) new or other evidence was available, or b) a material change of circumstances had occurred. The regulator, the Real Estate Council of Ontario (“RECO”) was not satisfied that the requirements were met and issued a Notice of Proposal (“NOP”) to deny reinstatement. A.L. appealed the denial to the Licence Appeal Tribunal (“LAT”). A.L. walked out of the LAT hearing after his adjournment request was denied. The tribunal decided to proceed in his absence. As a result, A.L. presented no evidence that he could meet this reinstatement requirements and the appeal was dismissed.

A.L. then appealed the LAT decision to the Divisional Court and sought judicial review based on procedural unfairness arguments. In its decision of November 19, 2025, the Divisional Court exercised its discretion not to conduct a judicial review given that the issues could adequately be resolved through the appeal process, and that his grounds of appeal were without merit.

A.L. sought leave to appeal the Divisional Court decision to the Ontario Court of Appeal. However, he failed to meet the 15-day application window by approximately one month. On this motion, he sought an extension of time to file his application for leave to appeal.

Issue:

1. Should A.L. be granted and extension of time to file an application for leave to appeal?

Holding:

Motion dismissed.

Reasoning:

1. No. The Court dismissed A.L’s motion for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal. The proposed appeal was entirely without merit and nothing would be gained by allowing an ill-fated application for leave to proceed. The Court outlined that this was “one of those rare cases” where it was in the interests of justice to deny an extension for leave to appeal.

In support of the application, A.L. argued that the Divisional Court erred: (1) in the interpretation of “material change in circumstance”; (2) in failing to provide a pathway, with specified criteria, for reinstatement; and (3) in upholding a proceeding that was unfair. A.L. raised additional claims in oral submissions including (4) RECO counsel made inaccurate representations that misguided the Divisional Court; and (5) the Registrar, who A.L. asserted had caused the issues under appeal, had allegedly been discredited by a government report and is under investigation.

The Court found that issues (1), (2), and (3) had absolutely no merit as grounds for leave to appeal. The Court found that with respect to ground of appeal (4), A.L. had provided no specifics of his factual challenges to the representations made by RECO counsel. Lastly, the Court found that for ground (5), A.L. had not shown how the Registrar’s current difficulties could have any bearing on the LAT decision or the decision of the Divisional Court to deny his appeal.

Seferovic v. 285 Spadina SPV Inc., 2026 ONCA 32

[Paciocco J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

RH, acting in person

RF, acting in person

S. Alexanian, for the responding party 2356802 Ontario Corp.

No one appearing for the responding parties DS (also known as AS), RA and RN

Facts:

These motions arose from litigation relating to a banquet and concert hall business that the moving party, RH, undertook in 2018 through a corporation he then controlled, 285 Spadina SPV Inc. (“285 Spadina”). The underlying litigation developed in two streams: (1) an application related to disputes between 285 Spadina as tenant and 235 Corp. as landlord (the “Lease Application”); and (2) a parallel application which sought oppression remedies initiated by investors of 285 Spadina (the “Oppression Application”).

RH initiated numerous proceedings in both streams of litigation. On September 19, 2023, Osborne J. declared RH to be a vexatious litigant (the “Vexatious Litigant Order”) under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act (“CJA”). An appeal from that decision was administratively dismissed for delay, and that dismissal had never been set aside. The Vexatious Litigant Order provided that RH was prohibited from instituting any further proceedings in any court except by leave of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice.

In July 2025, RH brought an application for leave to bring a r. 51.06 motion to set aside orders made by Kimmel J. in April 2022, which was denied, and a case conference before Cavanagh J. was scheduled. Cavanagh J. ordered that both the Lease Application and Oppression Application be dismissed. RH then appealed Cavanagh J.’s decision. The Registrar’s office accepted his notice of appeal for filing without leave which included a broad array of procedural and substantive relief that went beyond the issues addressed in Cavanagh J.’s decision.

The motions before the Court sought various relief, including an order setting aside the dismissal for delay of the appeal from the Vexatious Litigant Order and staying that order, to reinstate five previous appeals that had been either abandoned, dismissed for delay or on their merits.

Issue:

1. Did RH require leave to bring his motions?

Holding:

Motions dismissed.

Reasoning:

1. Yes. The Court dismissed the motions because RH did not obtain leave to bring them, pursuant to the terms of the Vexatious Litigant Order and s. 140(3) of the CJA. Regardless of whether any of RH’s objections had merit, a vexatious litigant order made under s. 140 of the CJA stood until such time as it was reversed or stayed. Neither the declaration that RH was a vexatious litigant nor Osborne J.’s order pursuant to s. 140(1) of the CJA had been reversed or stayed. They were still operative and had to be observed.

Although RH had the right to appeal the Vexatious Litigant Order without first seeking leave, he was still required to obtain leave to bring any motions within that appeal, which included a motion to set aside the dismissal order. Moreover, the motion was not properly brought as part of the proceeding. The Registrar should not have filed the appeal from the order of Cavanagh J. without leave nor should it have accepted the filing of the motion for dismissal. However, since the Court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal on that basis it refrained from doing so.

Rabinowitz v. 2528061 Ontario Inc., 2026 ONCA 21

[Roberts, Trotter and Dawe JJ.A.]

Counsel:

E. Karp and T.S. Shin, for the appellant

A. Quinn and D.R. Kapoor, for the respondent

Facts:

This appeal arose out of a failed commercial real estate agreement of purchase and sale. The appellant brought two actions that were heard together for specific performance of the agreement of purchase and sale and repayment of the six-month mortgage granted to the respondent, with interest at the prescribed rate of 12% commencing on the last day of the mortgage.

Despite the trial judge finding that the respondent had repudiated the agreement of purchase and sale, she declined to grant specific performance of the agreement to the appellant and dismissed his action. She ordered repayment to the appellant of the 6-month mortgage granted to the respondent but refused to grant the prescribed 12% interest rate under the mortgage, finding that it contravened s. 8 of the Interest Act.

The appellant brought a motion for reconsideration of her refusal to grant specific performance and for leave to amend his pleading to claim damages as an alternative remedy. The trial judge dismissed the appellant’s motion.

Issues:

1. Did the trial judge err in failing to grant specific performance?

2. In the alternative, did the trial judge err in failing to grant the appellant leave to amend the statement of claim to assert a claim for damages?

3. In the mortgage action, did the trial judge err in finding that the 12% interest under the mortgage offended s. 8 of the Interest Act?

Holding:

Appeal allowed in part.

Reasoning:

1. No. In the Court’s view the trial judge correctly applied the governing principles and determined that the appellant had failed to discharge his burden to demonstrate that either the commercial property, purchased as a potential investment opportunity, or the agreement of purchase and sale was subjectively or objectively unique. The Court saw no error in the trial judge’s conclusions that: 1) the appellant had not demonstrated that damages would be inadequate; and 2) damages would in fact be an adequate remedy. They also agreed with the trial judge’s determination that the fact that damages may be awarded against the respondent in another unrelated proceeding in relation to the same property did not render damages here inadequate or otherwise compel an order for specific performance.

2. No. The trial judge appropriately recognized the prejudice to the respondent and the corresponding abuse of process that would have been caused by allowing an amendment in the present case. The appellant made the deliberate choice not to claim damages as an alternative remedy and confirmed to the trial judge in closing submissions that no damages were claimed. The Court agreed that allowing the amendment would have caused prejudice to the respondent and to the administration of justice. The appellant failed to satisfy the Sagaz test, as he had not provided any evidence of his alleged damages.

3. Yes. The trial judge erred by failing to give effect to the clear words of the parties’ mortgage agreement. The six-month mortgage was given interest-free in consideration of the respondent agreeing to allow an extension of time for the appellant to conduct due diligence with respect to the subject property and the appellant’s advance of $600,000 by way of the release of the purchase deposit of $250,000 and advancement of a further $350,000 to the respondent. On closing, the $600,000 advanced under the mortgage would be deducted from the purchase price. With respect to interest, the mortgage agreement stipulated as follows (“the interest clause”):

The Interest Rate of the Charge shall be 0% until the Balance Due Date on July 10, [2018][1]. Beginning July 10, [2018], the Interest Rate of the Charge shall be 12.0%, calculated monthly, not in advance, until the payment of the Charge in full.

There was no tying of the increase of the mortgage interest to any default. It was common ground that the mortgage was not in default on July 10, 2018. The trial judge interpreted the interest clause to mean that 12% interest would start to run on the first day of default on July 11, 2018, in contravention of s. 8 of the Interest Act. It was significant that the interest rate commenced prior to the mortgage being in default, as it was consistent with the parties’ agreement with respect to the purchase of the property. The six-month interest-free mortgage became part of the purchase agreement between the parties and was premised on the completion of the purchase agreement. If the agreement did not close, then there was no further rationale for the interest-free mortgage. Rather, the mortgage would stand independently at a 12% rate of interest to which the parties agreed. There was no basis to disturb that agreement.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Talpade v. AMJ Campbell Company Toronto East, 2026 ONCA 30

[Trotter, Gomery and Dawe JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Heard in Writing, No Counsel Mentioned

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Orders, Setting Aside, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 2.1.01

Flexpark Inc. v. Ercolani, 2026 ONCA 36

[Miller, Zarnett and Monahan JJ.A.]

Counsel:

G. Cadogan, for the appellant

C. Internicola and N. Przulj, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Third-Party Claims

Adjala-Tosorontio (Township) v. Saunders, 2026 ONCA 42

[Roberts J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

A.L., acting in person, and for T. S.

J. J. Feehely, T. Webster and D. Anderson, for the Corporation of the Township of Adjala-Tosorontio

M. Seddigh, appearing as amicus curiae, Pro Bono Ontario

Keywords: Costs

Abdelwahed v. Ahmed, 2026 ONCA 33

[van Rensburg, Paciocco and Thorburn JJ.A.]

Counsel:

G. Cadogan, for the appellant

H.B.R.A., acting in person

V. Lam, agent for the respondent

Rabbani v. Furney, 2026 ONCA 43

[George, Favreau and Gomery JJ.A.]

Counsel:

AAFF and MF, acting in person

L. Vittas, for the respondent

Dong v. Boone, 2026 ONCA 37

[Roberts, Copeland and Dawe JJ.A.]

Counsel:

R. H. Waddell, for the appellant

S. Khan, for the respondent

The information contained in our summaries of the decisions is not intended to provide legal advice and does not necessarily cover every matter raised in a decision. For complete information or for specific advice, please read the decision or contact us.

Any article or other information or content expressed or made available in this Section is that of the respective author(s) and not of the OBA.

Court of Appeal Summaries (January 19 – January 23)

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CIVIL DECISIONS

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS