In Baker v. Van Dolder’s Home Team Inc., 2025 ONSC 952 (“Baker”), the termination clauses were contested on two grounds. The first was that the “without cause” termination provision allowed termination “at any time”. The second was that the “with cause” termination provision defined just cause more broadly than the “willful misconduct” standard provided for in O Reg 288/01. Baker alleged that these both contravened the Employment Standards Act, 2000(“ESA”). The motions judge, relying on Waksdale v. Swegon North America, 2020 ONCA 391(“Waksdale”), found in favour of the plaintiff, concluding that both clauses were invalid, despite the repeated language undertaking to comply with all minimum ESA entitlements.
In Li v. Wayfair Canada ULC., 2025 ONSC 2959 (“Li”), the termination clauses included language providing for termination “at any time and for any reason”, and, as in Baker, repeatedly emphasized their intention to comply with the ESA’s minimum standards. Unlike Baker however, the termination provision in Li defined “cause” pursuant to the standard of “willful misconduct”. The motions judge found in favour of the plaintiff, concluding that read as a whole, the agreement sought only limit the employer’s obligation of that provided by the provisions of the ESA”. The motions judge expressly recognized the decision in Baker but found the wording of the provisions at issue to be distinguishable.
THE COURT OF APPEAL SHINES A LIGHT
In the opening of the Court’s reasons, Justice Monahan, pointedly noted that “[t]he two orders under appeal suggest that the uncertainty in the jurisprudence governing termination provisions in employment contracts has yet to be satisfactorily resolved.” The Court highlighted that the termination language at issue in the two agreements was substantially identical, and yet the decisions issued by the respective motions judges were fundamentally at odds on the issue of the enforceability of that language.
The Court recognized that employment contracts must be interpreted differently than commercial contracts to preserve employment law principles, such as the protection of vulnerable employees. However, it also recognized that making sense of termination provisions still amounted to an exercise in contractual interpretation. As such, the fundamental principles applicable, including discerning the parties' objective intentions from the contract as a whole and the surrounding circumstances, could not be dispensed with. The Court held that when considered in the context of each agreement as a whole, and the surrounding circumstances, the provisions at issue both reflected an objective intention to comply with the minimum ESA standards. As such, the Baker appeal was allowed and the Li appeal was dismissed.
ANALYSIS
Principles of Contractual Interpretation Still Apply
The central significance of Baker and Li is not that it creates new principles of employment law. Rather, it confirms that termination clauses remain subject to the ordinary principles of contractual interpretation.
Baker and Li makes clear that courts should avoid striving to find an ambiguity where none reasonably exists as doing so does not benefit employees, few of whom have the resources necessary to have such ambiguity judicially determined. As the Court highlighted, genuine ambiguity only arises where there are two or more reasonable, but differing interpretations considered in the context of the entire contract.
ESA compliance is a matter of substance, not terminology
One of the most significant holdings in Baker and Li was the Court's confirmation that the phrases "at any time" and "for any reason" do not automatically invalidate a termination provision. Such language is not, on its own, evidence of an intention to circumvent the ESA. The Court emphasized contextual interpretation and cautioned against a "magic words" approach that treats isolated language as legally determinative.
Further, while O Reg 288/01 establishes a "wilful misconduct" threshold for disentitlement to statutory termination and severance pay, neither the ESA nor its regulations require parties to adopt that standard as the contractual definition of cause. The ESA merely prohibits contracting out of its minimum standards. Accordingly, the Court held that agreements may adopt a broader contractual cause standard, provided employees retain their ESA minimum entitlements absent wilful misconduct. The Court similarly rejected the idea that the agreement ought to have explicitly indicated the differences between the common law “cause” standard and the ESA “willful misconduct” standard. The Court instead confirmed that “[i]t is well established that employers may referentially incorporate ESA entitlements in an employment contract and that such provisions are valid.” In this respect, Baker and Li may narrow the practical reach of decisions such as Dufault v. Ignace (Township), where considerable weight was placed on the literal implications of particular words when read in isolation.
Waksdale Stands
The Court in Baker and Li explicitly declined to reconsider Waksdale based on having found the provisions before it to be compliant with the ESA. As such, the principles affirmed in Waksdale continue to apply. Severability clauses cannot on their own cure an otherwise invalid termination provision and the invalidity of one termination provision in an agreement may render other termination provisions invalid. In essence, Baker and Li addresses whether a termination provision is invalid in the first place, whereas Waksdale governs the consequences of that invalidity.
CONCLUSION
Baker and Li represents a significant and welcome realignment of Ontario's termination clause jurisprudence. However, this tale may not yet be at its conclusion. Mr. Baker filed an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) on October 5, 2026 which remains pending. Accordingly, whether the SCC will grant leave, and potentially weigh in on the issues raised in Baker and Li, remains to be seen.
Any article or other information or content expressed or made available in this Section is that of the respective author(s) and not of the OBA.